Using advanced audit data analytics tools, public accounting firms propose that they can analyze the entire population of accessible client transactions. While firms emphasize the potential benefits to audit efficiency and effectiveness, they caution that this approach provides no greater than the current level of "reasonable" assurance than does traditional auditing techniques. In the context of a subsequent audit failure where an investor has initiated a law suit, we examine whether the audit methodology (audit data analytics versus traditional auditing techniques) and the type of internal control opinion (unqualified versus adverse) affect perceptions of audit quality and assurance and perceptions of auditor negligence. In the wake of auditors issuing more adverse ICFR opinions, there may be differences in how users perceive assurance levels and attribute blame in circumstances of an audit failure. We develop our expectations using the theory of blame attribution. Using a 2x2 full factorial experimental design, we predict and find that when auditors issue an unqualified ICFR opinion, jurors assess auditors as more negligent when auditors employ traditional auditing techniques (compared to audit data analytic techniques). In subsequent analyses, we find that use of audit data analytic tools increases perceptions of audit quality, such that jurors assess more blame to the plaintiff for their loss, assigning less negligence to the auditor. We view this finding as indicative of the jurors believing that when the auditor uses audit data analytics the auditor has exceeded the minimally expected audit testing techniques. Overall, our study informs regulators, practitioners, and academics about the perceived assurance effects of using advanced technological tools on the audit as well as the corresponding litigation effects.
Introduction
This study examines whether an auditor's testing methodology and the internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) opinion affect jurors' perceptions in a litigation setting.
Specifically, we examine whether indicators of audit quality such as the use of audit data analytics (ADAs) and issuing an adverse ICFR opinion impact the perceived level of audit quality provided by, and the amount of blame attributed to auditors when there is a subsequent audit failure. Two important drivers of audit quality motivate our study. First, audit practitioners and standards setters believe that leveraging technology to enable ADA techniques, such as testing a full population of transactions versus a sample, can enhance the quality of financial statement audits. These ADAs can be used in any phase of the audit, can manifest in various forms, and can revolutionize the nature, timing, and extent of audit testing (Brown-Liburd, Issa, and Lombardi 2015; Cao, Chychyla, and Stewart 2015) . However, while audit practitioners tout the benefits of ADAs for audit quality, they caution that these benefits increase neither the actual nor the perceived level of assurance provided by these audits (EY 2014; KPMG 2014; Deloitte 2016; PwC 2016) . While current auditing standards only require auditors to collect audit evidence using traditional sampling techniques (PCAOB 2016a) , focus on the use of ADAs by auditors is increasing. As a result, it is important to examine whether financial statement users perceive the use of ADAs as steps taken to enhance audit quality and whether this enhancement results in fewer auditor negligence verdicts.
A second factor motivating our study is that auditors provide integrated audits attesting to both the operating effectiveness of ICFR as well as the fairness of presentation of the financial statements and related disclosures (PCAOB 2007 ). Audit quality is enhanced when the auditor's assessment of the ICFR operating effectiveness informs the level of substantive testing and perceptions of the likelihood of a material misstatement in the financial statements. The ICFR opinion also provides an immediate and public signal to financial statement users about auditors' assessment of the quality of financial reporting and signals the quality of the auditor's work (Jennings, Pany, and Reckers 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and LaFond 2009) . For example, when auditors issue an adverse ICFR opinion they signal financial statement users that they identified one or more material weaknesses in the company's system of internal controls and that there is an increased potential for a material misstatement in the accompanying financial statements.
Absent an audit failure or additional information such as a critical audit matter paragraph (PCAOB 2017) , the auditor's report is silent about additional efforts auditors take to improve audit quality such as the auditor's testing methodology. In a jury trial, part of an auditor's defense is a description of the testing methodology in relation to requirements of auditing standards (PCAOB 2016a). We examine whether jurors' awareness of the use of ADAs moderates the effect that the ICFR opinion has on perceptions of audit quality and, ultimately, negligence.
We form our predictions based on blame attribution which is a subset of attribution theory and describes how individuals determine who to hold responsible for an event such as an audit failure. During a trial, jurors are aware that a misstatement occurred; they hear arguments from both parties, learn more about the auditor's approach, and must then determine who is to blame for the plaintiff's loss (Lowe and Reckers 1994; Kadous 2000 Kadous , 2001 Clarkson, Emby, and Watt 2002; Peecher and Piercey 2008; Becker, Lawrence, and Sennetti 2009; Backof 2015) . While use of ADAs and an adverse ICFR opinion likely signal higher audit quality, we predict an interactive effect of these signals on jurors' auditor negligence verdicts. Specifically, absent a public and more salient signal provided by an adverse ICFR opinion, jurors will assess auditor negligence as higher after an audit failure when the auditor uses traditional sampling techniques relative to when they use ADAs to execute audit testing and when auditors also issue an unqualified ICFR opinion.
Alternatively, we predict no difference in assessed auditor negligence, regardless of the auditor's testing approach, when the auditor issues an adverse ICFR opinion.
We conducted a 2x2 between-subjects full factorial experiment and manipulated the auditor's substantive testing methodology (ADAs versus traditional sampling) and the ICFR opinion (unqualified versus adverse) and measured jurors' assessments of auditor negligence. We also measured jurors' perceptions of audit quality and attribution of blame for the loss suffered by investors. ADAs change both the nature of an audit and the extent of audit evidence gathered. Our study narrows the focus to a type of ADA which utilizes advanced technology to test the population of a client's transactions for auditor-specified characteristics related to revenue recognition such as controls that examine whether all sales transactions in the sales journal are supported by a customer order, shipping document, and invoice to validate the transaction information. Results of this dual-purpose test allow auditors to identify both higher risk transactions and inefficiencies in established internal control procedures; results also serve as a substantive test in the audit of the financial statements. Each test could improve two key elements of audit quality: audit efficiency and effectiveness.
Participants were 800 jury-eligible individuals recruited through an online platform. We find that the ICFR opinion has a direct effect on jurors' negligence verdicts, such that an adverse opinion results in lower perceptions of auditor negligence. We find no direct effect of the audit testing methodology on perceptions of auditor negligence; however, consistent with our expectations, we find an interactive effect which suggests that when an auditor issues an unqualified ICFR opinion jurors assess negligence as higher when the auditor uses traditional sampling techniques versus ADAs. In contrast, when auditors issues an adverse ICFR opinion, jurors assess negligence no differently whether the auditor uses traditional sampling techniques or ADAs.
To further explore these findings, we examine the mediating role of blame attribution on jurors' evaluations of auditor negligence. We measure the extent to which participants blame auditors relative to the extent to which they attribute blame to management and to the investor (i.e., the plaintiff in our setting). Results demonstrate that when auditors issue an adverse ICFR opinion, jurors are less likely to hold the auditor responsible and perceive that both management and the plaintiff are more responsible for the loss suffered by the plaintiff. When the auditor uses ADAs, the plaintiff is viewed as relatively more responsible for the loss suffered. We view the mediation results as suggesting that both the adverse ICFR opinion and the use of ADAs represent strong signals of audit quality that collectively lower the likelihood that jurors perceive auditors as negligent for a subsequent misstatement in the financial statements. Our supplemental analyses also provide evidence consistent with the notion that the use of ADAs enhances audit quality and evidence consistent with practitioners' caution that such use provides no more than reasonable assurance that the financial statements are fairly presented.
Our study informs regulators, practitioners, and academics about the perceived assurance effects of using one form of ADA in the audit and the impact of the ICFR opinion on litigation outcomes after a misstatement in the financial statements. For regulators, our study suggests that financial statement users view the use of ADAs, as measured in our study, as employing a higher standard of due professional care and view ADAs as steps taken to ensure higher audit quality.
This finding is particularly useful to the PCAOB as it strives to better understand the effects of ADAs on the audit process and to develop auditing standards that more widely promote such innovation in audit engagements (e.g., Zhang, Pawlicki, McQuilken, and Titera 2012) . In addition, our study is consistent with prior research which suggests an adverse ICFR opinion provides a salient and useful signal of audit and financial reporting quality (e.g., Wu and Tuttle 2014) , but is one of the first to demonstrate the subsequent effect of this signal on litigation outcomes. For audit practitioners, our results lend credence to the notion that utilizing ADAs enhances audit quality; our results also provide some support for the supposition that the increase in audit quality is not associated with an increase in the perceived level of assurance beyond the standard of reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement (PCAOB 2007) .
For researchers, our study highlights how knowledge of auditors' use of advanced technology to enable testing that exceeds current auditing standards affects others' perceptions of audit quality; additionally, our study provides many avenues for future research.
In the remainder of the paper, we review prior auditor litigation literature and develop hypotheses. After this, we provide a summary of the experimental methodology and discuss results. Finally, we offer concluding remarks and implications for future research.
Background and Hypothesis Development
In auditor negligence cases, jurors evaluate whether auditors exercised due professional care in conducting the audit (Causey and Causey 1991) . Due professional care (also referred to as "standard of reasonable care") suggests that the auditors applied a level of reasoning and judgment like any other careful and competent auditor would in a similar circumstance (Kadous 2000) .
Evaluating due professional care requires jurors to evaluate the steps auditors took to detect a material misstatement and to consider any salient signals auditors provide about the likelihood of such a misstatement to financial statement users.
To investigate juror decision making and the assessment of auditor negligence, we model blame attribution by drawing on attribution theory. Attribution theory describes how individuals assess and attribute responsibility and culpability (i.e., blame attribution) to individuals when there is a failure (Jennings, Kneer, and Reckers 1993) . Kelley and Michela (1980) illustrate both the antecedents and consequences of attribution behavior. Antecedents refer to certain information about the behavior of the individual and how the circumstances surrounding this behavior are used by the decision maker to infer cause. Consequences are the expectations that the decision maker forms related to the information and perceived cause. Specific to our study, jurors' knowledge and interpretation of auditors' efforts to conduct a quality audit through issuance of an appropriate ICFR opinion and higher quality audit testing by using ADAs can influence jurors' outcome expectation and therefore, jurors' attributions of responsibility for the subsequent audit failure. In litigation, jurors evaluate each party's role in the failure before attributing blame or causation to one, some, or all parties. As such, we argue that under certain conditions, despite a subsequently discovered material misstatement, jurors could still attribute less blame to the auditor. We develop our expectations below.
Audit testing: ADAs versus traditional sampling techniques
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) defines ADAs as "the science and art of discovering and analyzing patterns, identifying anomalies, and extracting other useful information in data underlying or related to the subject matter of an audit through analysis, modeling, and visualization for planning or performing the audit" (AICPA 2015). ADAs can be used at any stage of the audit. The use of advanced testing methods such as ADAs could significantly transform the process of auditing financial statements, resulting in enhanced audit effectiveness and audit efficiency-both elements and signals of audit quality (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015; Cao et al. 2015) . Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) board member Steven Harris recently echoed this sentiment suggesting that "these technological tools could allow auditors to make better decisions and assessments throughout the audit…thereby improving audit quality." (PCAOB 2016c). However, the Big 4 firms are careful to acknowledge the positive and negative implications for audit quality in the era of Big Data (e.g., Earley 2015; Liddy 2015; EY 2015; KPMG 2012) .
One means of operationalizing the concept of ADAs is using technology to allow inspection of the entire population of data underlying a company's financial statements rather than examining a limited number of transactions using the traditional sampling approach (BrownLiburd et al.; Cao et al. 2015; Murphy and Tysiac 2015; PwC 2015; PCAOB 201b) . This approach potentially results in a more effective and efficient audit and mitigates the efficiency-effectiveness tradeoff often encountered with traditional sampling methods.
Overall, utilization of ADA tools and techniques provide audit firms the opportunity to increase the sufficiency of audit evidenced gathered at a similar cost (Byrnes, Criste, Stewart, and Vasarhelyi 2014) ; this results in higher audit quality and reduced audit risk. This technology produces a number of potential exceptions from which auditors may further examine all or a sample based on available audit resources. Alternatively, using traditional sampling requires auditors to extrapolate the magnitude of any exceptions to the population. The former approach allows auditors to focus on higher risk transactions that have the most potential to increase the risk of material misstatement.
Perceptions of ADAs as a signal of audit quality
Little empirical evidence exists regarding the impact of ADAs on audit quality. However, findings from recent studies suggest that some forms of ADAs such as Big Data visualizations (Rose, Rose Sanderson, and Thibodeau. 2017 ) and continuous auditing (Barr-Pulliam 2017a , 2017b ) affect perceptions of and actual audit quality. Given that ADAs allow auditors to develop greater insights into a client's business and financial statements, jurors could perceive auditors' examining the entire population of a client's transactions as more indicative of a higher quality audit than when auditors employ traditional sampling techniques. Accordingly, jurors will likely perceive auditors' application of ADAs as going beyond the expected standard of performance from auditors in an analogous situation ("due professional care") and as taking steps to perform a higher quality audit (Maksymov and Nelson 2017) .
1 In an audit failure setting, jurors could be less likely to assess auditors as negligent when auditors employ ADA techniques and could attribute this failure to factors outside the auditors' control such as management collusion. Conversely, employing ADAs could engender juror perceptions that a competent auditor should be able to identify an existing misstatement when the auditors examine the entire population of a client's transactions.
Failure to identify an existing misstatement can be perceived as incompetence which could then lead jurors to assess auditors as more negligent for the subsequent misstatement. Prior auditor liability research suggest that jurors' perceptions of auditor competence is both nuanced and context-dependent when the quality of the audit varies. Awareness of the tactics auditors use to improve detection of misstatements moderates how jurors assess auditor negligence. For example, standards of care to which jurors hold auditors varies with the severity of negligence outcomes (e.g., Kadous 2000; Arel, Jennings, Pany, and Reckers 2012) . This prior research also suggests that the timing of the assessment of auditors' standard of care (i.e., before or after jurors learn about steps the auditor took to improve audit quality) also affects jurors' negligence verdicts (Maksymov and Nelson 2017) . Prior research is mixed, however, on the effect of audit quality on negligence judgments (Kadous 2000; Reffett 2010; Arel et al. 2012; Maksymov and Nelson 2017) .
Our study specifically extends auditor negligence studies by Reffett (2010) and Maksymov and Nelson (2017) . Reffett (2010) manipulates audit quality as 1) whether auditors attend to a fraud cue and 2) whether auditors perform limited or extensive investigation when they identify the fraud cue. The results of his study suggest no effect of the extent of investigation when auditors identify the fraud risk, but his results further suggest that jurors assess auditors as more negligent when auditors identify a fraud risk than when they do not identify the risk and, therefore, performed no testing. In a series of experiments, Maksymov and Nelson (2017) investigate findings presented in Kadous (2000) related to jurors' assessment of due professional care and findings in Reffett (2010) related to the extent of investigation on juror assessments. The experiment that most closely relates to our study manipulates audit quality as low or high and operationalizes quality by looking at both a relatively small and large sample size to investigate an identified fraud risk. The experiment also examines the timing of jurors' assessment of due professional care as either before or after jurors make negligence verdicts. Their findings suggest that, beyond the situational context that characterizes the aforementioned studies, jurors' perceptions of the extent to which auditors actually met the expectation of a reasonable standard of care and jurors' perceptions of auditors' specific efforts to improve audit quality facilitate how jurors' ex post knowledge of a misstatement affects their negligence assessments.
We specifically extend their study by examining the effect of audit quality in a context where auditors use more advanced technology to examine the entire population of revenue transactions. While Maksymov and Nelson (2017) operationalize high audit quality as a large sample size versus lower audit quality as a small sample size, they essentially create a traditional sampling context as compared to our context using ADAs versus traditional sampling. 
2009). Research examining auditor ICFR audit opinions finds an adverse opinion is associated
with increased management turnover (Johnstone, Li, and Rupley 2011) . Further, investors assess higher risks of misstatement in the current financial statements and restatements, higher information asymmetry and less transparency, higher risk premium and cost of capital, and lower sustainability and predictability of earnings (Lopez, Vandervelde and Wu 2009 ).
Research on auditor negligence specifically demonstrates that ex ante and ex post disclosures about auditor judgments and decisions during the ICFR and financial statement audits, such as additional procedures used to increase the likelihood of detection of errors or fraud, affect juror decision making. Focusing on the ex-ante disclosure, Brasel, Doxey, Grenier, and Reffett (2016) find that jurors assess lower auditor negligence when the auditor signals financial reporting quality concerns through disclosures made in a critical audit matter paragraph-an ex ante and publicly available signal like the ICFR opinion in our study.
By issuing an adverse ICFR opinion, auditors inform financial statement users that they identified one or more material weaknesses in the company's system of internal controls and that the material weakness was considered in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit tests applied in the audit of the financial statements. As such, we expect that jurors will perceive the adverse ICFR opinion as a salient signal to investors that there is an increased potential for a financial statement misstatement. Because of this signal, we expect that jurors will perceive auditors' judgments as acceptable and assign less blame to the auditor when a material misstatement is subsequently discovered. Further, because management is ultimately responsible for establishing an effective system of internal controls, the ICFR opinion will serve as a salient 
Research Design

Participants
We used a between-subjects experiment to examine jurors' assessment of auditor negligence in an audit malpractice suit. We identified jury-eligible participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 4 Prior accounting studies also use MTurk participants (called workers)
as a proxy for jurors (Brasel et al. 2016; Grenier, Pomeroy, and Stern 2015; Grenier, Lowe, Reffett, and Warne 2015; Peecher, Reffett, and Zimbelman 2016; Maksymov and Nelson 2017) . A total of 800 workers successfully completed the task and provided an accurate randomly-generated survey code. These participants received $1 ($800 total). Of 800 workers meeting the inclusion criteria, 222 (27.75%) failed to correctly answer both manipulation checks. The 578 participants who answered both manipulation check questions correctly received a $0.50 bonus (total of $289).
Total earnings were $1,089 or $1.36. Participants completed the task in an average of 27 minutes, as a result, our hourly rate of $3.03 [calculated as ($1.36/27 minutes) x 60 minutes] exceeds the average hourly MTurk wage of $1.38 (Horton and Chilton 2010) .
Of our 800 participants, the mean age was 37.1 years old; 58.0% were female, and 14.8% had a graduate degree. Approximately 11.6% had prior experience serving on a jury, and 23.3%
had prior investment experience. Participants in our sample are comparable with those in recent studies eliciting juror negligence judgments in auditor litigation cases (e.g., Lowe, Reckers, and 
Experimental materials
In Stage One of the experiment (see Appendix 1), we screened potential participants to assess jury eligibility. Participants moved to Stage Two if they self-reported that: 1) they were U.S. citizens, 2) they were at least 18 years of age, and 3) they had taken no more than 2 accounting or finance courses. After reading and accepting the informed consent agreement and reading background information provided in Stage Two, participants were presented with information about the financial statement auditing process. The instrument explains the internal controls over financial reporting audit, the relationship between internal controls and the substantive testing procedures in the financial statement audit, as well as key terms such as "reasonable assurance"
and "due professional care." The instrument also explains the meaning of an unqualified ("clean") audit versus an adverse audit opinion for the internal controls over financial reporting as well as the financial statement audits. We used comprehension check questions for each of these concepts to ensure participants understood the overall steps auditors perform in the integrated financial statement audit process and the related auditing terms. Participants were required to answer these comprehension check questions correctly before they could advance to the next stage of the study.
Participants who answered incorrectly or failed to respond to these questions were not allowed to continue with the study. This approach ensured that participants understood key auditing concepts that we described in the case prior to examining the transcript of the legal proceedings.
In Stage Three, participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions (described below). Each participant assumed the role of a juror and read the transcript of a hypothetical jury trial related to an audit failure. This hypothetical case is summarized as follows:
The hypothetical company, Rapid Shipping, is a publicly traded shipping company for which the audit firm issued an unqualified opinion on the financial statements as well as an ICFR opinion (either clean or adverse). After the issuance of the audit report, a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation suggested that there was a material misstatement of revenue not identified by the auditors. A large pension fund investor (the plaintiff) sues the auditor for negligence alleging that the audit failure was a result of failure to exercise due professional care.
The audit firm contends it used an audit testing methodology that conforms to auditing standards and exercised sufficient professional judgment. After reading the trial transcript, participants were given jury instructions and responded to our primary dependent measures and supplemental and demographic questions.
Independent variables
Appendix 2 describes the between-subjects manipulations of ICFR opinion (unqualified vs. adverse) and audit methodology (statistical sampling vs. ADA testing). In the ICFR opinion (OPINION) condition participants were told that the audit firm issued either an unqualified opinion or an adverse opinion for the audit of internal controls over financial reporting, meaning that the auditors either did not or did identify weaknesses in internal controls specifically related to internal controls over the revenue recognition processes. We coded OPINION as "1" when the auditors issued an adverse ICFR opinion and "0" otherwise. For audit methodology (METHOD) one population of participants learned that the audit firm used audit statistical sampling techniques to examine a portion of the shipping transactions. Other participants learned that the audit form used data analytics software to examine the entire population of shipping transactions. We coded METHOD as "1" when auditors used ADAs and "0" otherwise. In the ADA testing condition, it was made clear to participants that auditors were using software to execute audit testing.
Participants were told that the audit approach allowed the auditors to draw conclusions about both the effectiveness of internal controls over shipping transactions and the validity (e.g., occurrence)
of recorded sales transactions.
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Dependent variables
Our primary dependent variable was a continuous measure of participants' assessment of auditor negligence (GUILT). Participants first indicated whether they believed the auditor was guilty or not guilty (VERDICT; coded as "1" for guilty, and "0" for not guilty). Participants who selected "guilty" were then asked to indicate the extent of guilt on an anchored scale where 50% = somewhat completely guilty and 100% = completely guilty. Participants who selected "not guilty" were asked to respond to a corresponding scale where 50% = somewhat completely not guilty and 100% = completely not guilty. We recoded and combined the two measures to create the continuous measure of guilt on a scale ranging from 0% (completely not guilty) to 100%
(completely guilty). 
Results
Manipulation check
First, we asked participants to recall the auditor's testing methodology. We asked, "What approach did the auditor use to test sales revenue?" Of 800 participants meeting the inclusion criteria, 666 (83.25%) answered correctly. Second, we asked participants to recall the auditor's 6 The audit procedure used in the experiment served as a dual-purpose test (i.e., a test of sales transactions designed to evaluate the effectiveness of controls and detect monetary misstatements). 7 Following Hoffman, Joe, and Moser (2003) and Joe (2003) , our two scales exclude 0 -50% as assessments below 50% guilty effectively signal not guilty verdicts while assessments less than 50% not guilty signal guilty verdicts. (72.25%) passed both manipulation checks. Our inferences are qualitatively similar excluding those that passed one or both manipulation checks and we find no significant or systematic differences along the demographic dimensions or across any of the experimental conditions. Our analyses include all 800 participants. found the auditor not guilty of negligence. Jurors were more likely to find the auditor guilty of negligence when the auditor used traditional sampling techniques and issued an unqualified ICFR audit opinion (mean = 42.2%). In contrast, jurors found auditors less negligent when the auditor issued an adverse ICFR audit opinion, regardless of the audit methodology used (mean = 31.8%
Descriptive statistics
across METHOD). Figure 1 graphically depicts negligence assessments by experimental condition.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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Tests of hypotheses
We tested our hypotheses with an ANOVA model that uses a continuous measure of auditor negligence (GUILT) as the dependent variable and audit testing methodology (METHOD) and ICFR opinion (OPINION) as independent variables. This suggests a main effect for OPINION in our ANOVA model. Descriptive statistics in Table 2 and Figure 1 show a mean for GUILT of 36.04% in the adverse opinion condition and 41.15% in the unqualified opinion condition. As noted in panel A of Table 3, Finally, HYPOTHESIS 3 predicts jurors will assess auditors as more negligent when they employ traditional sampling versus ADA techniques and issue an unqualified ICFR opinion;
however, there will be no differences in negligence assessments when auditors issue an adverse ICFR opinion. HYPOTHESIS 3 predicts a disordinal interaction; consequently, we use contrast analysis to investigate these results. As such, we expected a significant planned contrast comparing METHOD when OPINION would be unqualified; and we expected an insignificant planned contrast when OPINION would be adverse. 10 Consistent with our prediction, panel B of Table 3 shows that jurors assess auditors as significantly more negligent when auditors use traditional sampling versus ADAs and also issue an unqualified ICFR opinion (mean difference = 6.28; p = 0.030). 11 We also find, as predicted, no difference in METHOD when auditors issue an adverse ICFR opinion (mean difference = -4.94; p = 0.069). Consistent with our theory, we find differences While prior studies have investigated the effects of audit documentation on jurors'
judgments (e.g., Backof 2015), we examine how the ICFR opinion and audit testing methodology affect negligence assessments. Our results are consistent with the literature and provide further evidence that the ICFR opinion is an important signal of potential problems and of the overall quality of the financial reporting (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009) . However, we demonstrate that this perception of quality is more pronounced when the auditor fails to signal a potential misstatement. Further, we find that the internal controls context differentially affects jurors' focus on the quality of the audit testing techniques auditors employ and jurors' assessments of auditor negligence. When there is no salient internal controls signal suggesting poor financial reporting quality, we find that jurors evaluate the use of ADAs as a higher quality testing technique that demonstrates auditors' intentions to conduct a quality audit (e.g., Reffett 2010; Maksymov and
Nelson 2017).
Additional analyses
Blame attribution
To further investigate our results, we examine the extent of blame jurors attribute to auditors, management, and the plaintiff after an audit failure. We use the Preacher and Hayes (2008) multiple mediator model to determine the effect of OPINION on GUILT through three measures of BlameAttribution (auditor, management, and plaintiff; see Figure 2 ). To derive BlameAttribution, we asked jurors to indicate each party's responsibility for the plaintiff's loss on a 10-point scale anchored on 1 (Not at all responsible) and 10 (Completely responsible). 12 Using all three measures in our mediation analysis allows us to determine the effect of each measure while controlling for the other two measures in the model.
As noted in Figure 2, 
Insert Figure 2 about here
In untabulated results, we also parse our overall mediation analyses by audit testing methodology to determine whether, like our ANOVA results for the interaction (HYPOTHESIS 3), the results are driven by auditors' use of traditional statistical sampling relative to ADAs. For traditional statistical sampling, we find similar and, in some instances, stronger results than our overall mediation analysis. We find that the effect of OPINION on GUILT is mediated by each of our measures of BlameAttribution at a 95 percent confidence level. The effect of OPINION on 13 Statistical inferences are unchanged when we use our binary measure of guilt (VERDICT). 14 Sobel's tests are significant for judgments of the probability of negligence for Blame Auditor (z = -3.20, p = 0.001) and Blame Plaintiff (z = -2.49, p = 0.013). 15 We also find that jurors blame auditors more in the unqualified versus adverse ICFR opinion conditions (means = 4.86 vs. 4.29, respectively; p < 0.001, one-tailed) . Additionally, jurors assess management as being more responsible when the ICFR opinion is adverse versus unqualified (means = 7.16 and 6.87, respectively; p = 0.033, one-tailed); which suggests that jurors believe that management is responsible for implementing effective controls over financial reporting and, therefore, at a minimum contributorily negligent when these controls are deemed ineffective. perceive audit quality to be enhanced.
Omnibus perceptions of audit data analytics on audit quality and assurance
To further investigate our results, we analyze jurors' overall perceptions of audit quality and assurance that the financial statements are free from material misstatement. We contend that use of ADAs as a testing methodology signals a higher quality audit. 16 In untabulated results, we find that jurors perceive audit quality as being higher when the auditor uses ADAs versus traditional statistical sampling audit testing procedures (means = 7. 83 vs. 7.48; p = 0.026, twotailed) .
Lastly, to examine whether jurors perceive that auditors provide relatively more assurance when they employ ADAs versus traditional sampling, we examine jurors' perceptions of assurance 16 Participants responded to the question "Did Smith CPAs intend to conduct a quality audit by using the audit testing approach they used to perform sales revenue testing?" on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all intended to conduct a high-quality audit) to 10 (Completely intended to conduct a high-quality audit). contention that ADAs lead to comparatively higher quality audits but provide no greater assurance than traditional sampling testing techniques.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine whether and to what extent auditors' use of audit data analytics in the substantive testing phase of the audit and the type of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) opinion affect both the perceived level of audit quality and jurors' assessment of auditor negligence after an audit failure. We develop our predictions based on attribution theory and particularly blame attribution. To test our expectations, we conducted a 2x2 between-subjects full factorial experiment where we manipulated the auditor's testing methodology (audit data analytics versus traditional sampling) and the ICFR opinion issued (unqualified versus adverse). We also measured, as a mediating factor, the extent of the attribution of blame for a negligence suit filed by an investor in one of our hypothetical auditor's clients. Our study is one of the first to directly examine whether the use of more advanced audit methodologies enhances jurors' perceptions of audit quality and assurance. Proponents contend that the use of ADAs will not only enhance audit effectiveness and efficiency but will also result in reduced audit risk and liability because auditors will be able to achieve a higher level of assurance. Our results suggest that jurors indeed perceive higher audit quality when auditors use ADAs, especially in situations where auditors face litigation exposure in an audit failure context. This study potentially has implications for regulators interested in additional audit quality indicators and factors to consider if auditing standards require revision to encourage or support auditors' leveraging of technology to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit. Our study has implications for practitioners interested in or currently using ADAs techniques in the audit process, despite audit practitioners' assertions that use of these techniques will have no effect on financial statement users' perceptions of audit quality and the level of assurance provided.
Our study also contributes to the auditing literature regarding the effects of ICFR opinion disclosure as well as factors that affect jurors' negligence judgments. In line with what Hammersley et al. (2008) find regarding the affect disclosure of ICFR opinions have on stock prices, we find that the disclosure of ICFR opinions provide a context within which jurors differentially attribute blame for an audit failure, interpret auditors' efforts to improve audit quality, and influence jurors' negligence decisions. Our study also provides avenues for future research on the effects of audit testing disclosure and complements prior and contemporaneous research on the use of technology to enhance the audit process (e.g., Brown-Liburd et al. 2015;
Barr-Pulliam 2017a; Rose et al. 2017) . 
